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CARLIN MEYER
INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS
IN THE WTO'S "NEW WORLD ORDER":
TOWARDS "DEVELOPMENT-BASED"
STANDARD SETTING
An Overview
The original hope which undergirded the creation of the International La-
bor Organization (ILO), that of taking labor competition off the table by lev-
eling the playing field as to labor standards, is no longer viable. A combina-
tion of changed economic realities and a divergence of interest between citi-
zens of developed and developing nations has made a new paradigm neces-
sary. These changed economic conditions include: instant communications
and rapid transportation, rapidly changing technologies, falling trade barri-
ers, blurring of economic nationalities (as well as of workplace roles and
requirements), and the enormous gap between the richest and poorest na-
tions, which did not exist to nearly the same degree in the late 19th century
when discussions which led to the formation of the ILO began.
Under the old paradigm, the ILO has adopted 193 labor conventions and
another 191 non-binding recommendations which address numerous work-
place issues, but these standards have been ratified by relatively few ILO-
member nations (the U.S., for example, has ratified only 14). The ILO has
addressed so-called "developmental standards"-those related to minimum
wage, overtime, and health and safety, which attempt to create an interna-
tional labor standards floor.
Rather, the ILO should focus on so-called "core" or "fundamental" stan-
dards such as freedom of association (that is, the right to form unions and
other workers' associations), the abolition of forced labor and the abolition of
the worst forms of child labor, and prohibitions on discrimination., This new
mission will focus ILO resources more effectively, not only because they will
be deployed more narrowly, but, more importantly, because they will be used
to address those issues on which there is relative international consensus-on
what might be termed "the basic human rights of labor," as opposed to those
over which there is what is sometimes termed a North-South split.
At the present time, 70% of the ILO's 175 members have ratified (and hence
agreed to abide by) only 25% (45 or fewer) of all ILO-adopted conventions.
By contrast, the adoption of the 1999 Convention on the Worst Forms of
Child Labor (a core standard) is an example of the ILO at its best, not only
because of its strong factual grounding, but primarily because of the interna-
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tional consensus developed and revealed in the three-year process from the
decision to address the issue, to the adoption of the Convention. As a result,
unlike many other conventions, Convention #182 was ratified by 72 coun-
tries in a mere 21 months.
Given the resistence by developing nations to the imposition of labor stan-
dards (because of their view that such standards are protectionist) it makes
little sense to address contentious "developmental" (or what might be termed
"economic issues") within the framework of the ILO or, for that matter, the
World Trade Organization (WTO). Instead, the ILO should abandon its many
non-consensus conventions and recommendations and use the tools of public
shaming and the threat of withdrawal of ILO technical assistance or even, in
the worst cases, ILO or WTO membership, to achieve compliance with core
(non-developmental) labor norms. Improving labor standards beyond the
"core" values, by contrast, should be left to economic development, which
will continue to be spurred on by robust free trade.
In summary, the ILO's effort to level the playing field so that labor stan-
dards are maintained at a humane level may no longer be necessary, because
free market competition among nations exploiting their comparative advan-
tages will raise those standards. In addition, such standard-setting is futile
because of our inability to gain consensus on those standards. This is particu-
larly evident in the resistance of developing nations with some of the lowest
standards to impingement on the comparative advantage their poverty (and
hence low labor costs) gives them in global competition. Rather, the ILO
should concentrate on protecting the most basic rights against the most egre-
gious violations.
It is highly unlikely that free trade, as currently pursued, and markets unfet-
tered by international labor regulation beyond ensuring against the worst forms
of child, forced labor, and discrimination, and the protection of associational
rights, will lead to improved labor conditions without the intervention of pub-
lic, govemmental-type bodies like the ILO.2
Changing International Economic Structures
Until the mid-1900s, national economic status and standards of living de-
pended largely on the abundance of natural resources, availability of capital
and labor, and culture. This is hardly an uncontroversial view. As Noam
Chomsky, and others, point out, the most important historical factor that sepa-
rates industrialized from developing nations has been whether the nation or
region was colonized by a European power.' British "development" of its
textile industry resulted from the deliberate destruction of the more advanced
cotton textile industries of India and Egypt, rather than the possession of natural
resources or abundant capital. Most industrial nations achieved their success
not only via colonial exploitation of the labor and resources of others, but
from protectionism-freely employing high tariffs and protected colonial
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markets to foster the development of domestic industry. Not until the mid-
18th century, when its industries were strong and it had virtually destroyed
competition from many quarters, did Britain turn to liberalized trade policies,
and the story has been similar elsewhere.4
The so-called economic miracles of Japan, Taiwan and other later-develop-
ing nations were not the product of unfettered free markets, but rather de-
pended heavily on the central role of state management.5 Since many of today's
developing nations have extremely weak national governments, and others
are being pressed by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and
the World Trade Organization to reduce or eliminate centralized state man-
agement in favor of free market liberalism, it is hardly a given that free trade
will lead to development and thereby improved labor standards. 6 Moreover,
there is little evidence that free market exploitation of comparative advantage
will lead to improved development and hence better labor standards for all.
To date, it has often meant selective improvement for some, and all too often
for the very few.
What have been termed heterodox, or "non-neoclassical," economists have
demonstrated that while productivity growth from trade "opens up the possi-
bility of paying higher wages" without necessarily negatively impacting the
competitiveness of a product or the profitability of investment, the two are
not inevitably linked. Rather, improvements in labor standards are dependent
on such factors as bargaining power, income distribution, and governmental
action.7 Other researchers have suggested that due to technology differences
between developing nations and their richer trade partners, the benefits of
liberalization fall less to improvements in minimum labor standards such as
wages, and more to profits.'
The ILO is a tripartite system in which organized labor, employers and
government have a voice in determining what are the appropriate conditions
under which goods and services are produced. (It may be that more voices,
such as those of NGOs or others who represent unorganized labor, women,
immigrants, and the informal sector should be present also, but that is a sepa-
rate issue.) The WTO treaties, by contrast, are typically negotiated with gov-
ernmental and business representatives at the table, but not labor. And, in-
creasingly, trade treaties emphasize this bipartite representation by providing
that firms, in addition to governments, may directly challenge treaty viola-
tions.9 Yet, ultimately, trade treaties will be strong determinants of labor con-
ditions, by setting the terms of competition among nations and therefore af-
fecting the bargaining power of workers and the ability of governments to
maintain labor standards. The WTO, which is dominated or at least perceived
to be dominated by the industrial powers, may not be the forum through which
the linkage of trade and labor issues should be addressed. But trade sanctions
must be available to redress labor violations, if decent working conditions
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and living standards are to be maintained. One way that might occur is by
permitting the ILO to levy trade sanctions, upon referral of a matter to it by
the WTO or any other body implementing or enforcing a trade agreement, or
perhaps even upon its independent determination that minimum labor stan-
dards are not being maintained.
A Proposal for a New Role for the ILO
Thus, changed circumstances have not led to a situation in which global
efforts to establish basic, minimum standards of economic justice are unnec-
essary. The ILO's founding premise that "universal and lasting peace" can
only be achieved by removing "injustice, hardship and privation" remains
salient today. This is especially true because, as Potter's paper points out, the
gap between rich and poor nations, and I would add, rich and poor individu-
als within nations, is enormous and apparently growing. In my view, interna-
tional standard-setting is important not only because the market will not, by
itself, guarantee development and will not ensure that its benefits are fairly
distributed, but because unjust and uneven distribution is producing and con-
tributing to widespread armed conflict. Despite media presentation of global
conflict as predominately ethnic or religious in nature, the evidence is strong
that, at least initially, distributional issues have been at the heart of conflicts
from Rwanda to the former Eastern Bloc countries to Asia and beyond.
I do not suggest that ILO adoption of minimum labor standards will neces-
sarily result in their ratification or implementation. But the effort helps to
keep labor standards on the international agenda and supports those strug-
gling to gain improved labor protections from national governments. It also
strengthens the hand of NGOs and others-including corporate officers and
ethical investors -who are pressing for corporate codes of conduct that in-
clude minimum labor standards. One of the results of the ILO's adoption of a
labor convention is that member nations are required to place it before their
governing bodies for ratification. Those bodies may choose not to ratify-
the United States has ratified only 14 conventions, only two of them "core"-
but at least a conversation about ratification is engendered. In the past, these
conversations have been contained within the governing bodies and did not
become part of national discourse. However, with today's greater internation-
alist focus and increased interest in these issues among NGOs, trade unions,
and others, they are more likely to become broad-based discussions in the
future.10
If labor rights are not included in international trade structures, such conver-
sations will be restricted to "core" issues. While such issues are clearly crucial
ones, they are not the only or the most important ones. Why should we accept
the premise that what we might term political rights-the right to freedom of
association, workplace equality and anti-discrimination, and freedom from sla-
very or forced labor-are "core" rights, while so-called "economic rights""
international labor standards in the wto's "new world order" 25
such as the right to a wage sufficient to feed a family apO the right to enjoy
leisure time sufficient to gain an education or enjoy one's family, are not?' 2 A
choice between these types of rights cannot be made on the basis of whether
international bodies can manage the sorts of detailed measures necessary for
enforcement; for both types of labor concerns, the devil is in the details.' 3
An Alternative Paradigm: "Globalization" of Labor Rights
There is an alternative paradigm based on the principle that minimum labor
standards should not be the same for industrialized and developing nations.' 4
Developing countries should be able to compete iniernationally with devel-
oped nations by using the comparative advantage low labor costs, among
other factors. (I should note, however, that it is far from clear that labor costs
are the primary factor creating this comparative advantage; economic, politi-
cal and social stability, as well as educational level, health, and culture, are
likely of far greater importance. This, in turn, may partly explain why the vast
majority of trade continues to take place between industrialized nations, rather
than between developing and industrialized ones. 15) It would be manifestly
unfair to require developing nations to meet labor standards appropriate to
developed'ones. It would also be unjust, both to their own workers and to
those of developing nations, to permit industrialized nations which have
achieved high levels of development by colonizing now-developing nations,
to compete with them by lowering the labor standards their own workers
achieved through collective and political action.
Rather, in order to raise labor standards at the bottom, and maintain them at
the top, labor standards should be set, by treaty or ILO initiative or both, in
accordance with the level of development.' 6 Nations should be grouped ac-
cording to level of development, and standards set appropriate to each grouped
level-with the representatives of nations subject to the standards at issue
having the predominate determining voices in standard-setting. This would
level the playing field among comparable nations, helping to eliminate the
incentive to compete by lowering labor standards and encouraging, via the
types of incentives described below, the raising of them. This would not only
assist in improving labor standards where poverty is widespread, but would
also help to prevent lowering of labor standards by industrialized nations
seeking to compete with one another.
Establishing differing standards would not be simple, but is not impossible.
States adopted variant labor standards in the early development of minimum
wage laws in the United States. Local boards successfully set wages that dif-
fered within a state as well as by industry. 7 In the early part of the twentieth
century, one of the first proposals for the adoption of a national minimum
wage aimed, in part, at leveling the wage competition between states and
employers that was thought to have contributed to the Great Depression, was
based on the state minimum wage laws. 8 The Black-Connery-bill in the early
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twentieth century, drew on these local systems in proposing to establish pub-
lic boards composed of employers, workers and public representatives (not
unlike the ILO system) to establish appropriate minimum wages and maxi-
mum hours by locality or region. The bill incorporated a requirement that
wages be pegged to actual living costs and ensure a living wage, an appropri-
ate basis for ILO "development-based" standard-setting as well. 19
Ultimately, the United States opted for a uniform national minimum wage,
enacted as the Fair Labor Standards Act, but variant wage and standard set-
ting remains a viable model, especially in a situation in which the differences
in level of development are great. Indeed, prevailing wage laws currently
still in effect in the United States continue to successfully set public wages by
measuring local and regional labor practices. 20 While the task of setting pre-
vailing wages among different nations may be more difficult than it is within
one nation, trade negotiations among numerous nations have handled issues
equally complex and have managed to make progress on many.2'
Potential Enforcement Models for International Labor Standards
Carrot and stick sanctions should be used to enforce minimum standards.
"Shaming" might well be effective between nations at the same level of de-
velopment and would certainly be more effective than when it is deployed
against those in far different economic positions. Providing, or withholding,
technical assistance is unlikely to have much impact on wealthy industrial-
ized nations, since they are likely to be those providing the assistance in the
first place. Stronger sanctions are needed, and I offer these:
First, nations at the same level of development should be entitled to engage
in trade sanctions against one another, as authorized by an ILO determination
of "a serious violation," much in the way the WTO operates with regard to
trade practices. As suggested earlier, trade treaties could incorporate a refer-
ral system to the ILO, so that ILO investigations could be generated indepen-
dently or upon referral by trade bodies. Second, sanctions should be directl)
available against firms that fail to meet, or fail to ensure that their subcontrac-
tors and lessees meet, the minimum standards established through some sor
of international penalty mechanism (just as corporations are able to receiv(
damages under NAFTA and other proposed treaties). The sanctions of inter,
national supervision (ILOIWTO expulsion) or creation of another "outcast'
status should be available as well. The strongest sanctions should be re
served for industrialized nations (and multinational corporations operatinj
within them) that lower existing labor standards. Sanctions proceedings shoui
be able to be commenced by all parties to the ILO-labor, employers, an
governments-as they now are.22
At the same time, the industrialized nations should offer not merely techni
cal assistance, but should also make funds available to assist developing na
tions seeking to improve labor standards. These funds could be augmente,
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by fines levied against firms and nations who lower or fail to meet labor
standards. For instance, studies suggest that child labor decreases with the
establishment of good schools. Funds should be deployed to assist nations
taking significant steps to reduce child labor to construct, establish or im-
prove schools. 23 Funds could be made available to children banned from work-
places due to heightened child labor standards, to pay for schooling and to
compensate for lost family income. In addition, international awards should
be given to the companies with the best employment practices, and the na-
tions with the best records of compliance, as determined by the ILO.2 4 There
are surely other incentives and sanctions worth exploring.
Finally, the scope of ILO standard setting in relation to women in the global
economy should be re-examined. Despite vast changes in the position of
women, especially in industrialized nations, much of women's labor through-
out the globe occurs in the informal sector left relatively untouched by labor
standards and enforcement. Within industrialized nations and in the unpaid
and, therefore, undervalued work of producing and caretaking the workforce
at all its stages of life, ILO standard-setting has had little impact. One of the
most important roles the ILO can play in the near future is to begin to develop
norms appropriate to these types and sectors of work. What obligation do
nations and firms have to make it possible for women to engage in paid work
despite child, elder and home care responsibilities? Should wages compen-
sate not simply for goods-and-services-producing labor, but for the labor re-
quired to produce the worker? Should these costs and others be factored
into the costs of production, and should firms be required to adopt account-
ing practices that reflect them? The twenty-first century ILO needs to con-
front these and other contemporary issues.
Conclusion
International governmental bodies such as the ILO are essential to ensuring
that those who provide the goods and services we all depend on are able to live
decent lives. Ensuring that all nations guarantee core rights, such as the right to
form unions and bargain collectively, is essential to achieving long lasting eco-
nomic justice for workers. This should be an ILO enforcement priority, just as
U.S. ratification of those conventions (which has yet to occur) should be a
priority at home. But, in addition, the ILO must reformulate and continue its
role of ensuring that labor competition does not deprive workers, including
those outside formal and paid employment, of a decent standard of living.
NOTES
1. The ILO has traditionally treated the principles of freedom of association, prohibi-
tion of forced labor, and equality of opportunity and treatment as the most funda-
mental, although the matter has been disputed within the ILO, and Edward Potter's
paper, appropriately, I think, treats prohibition of the worst forms of child labor as
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a "core" subject. See LAMMY BETTEN, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR LAW: SELECTED
ISSUES (1993) at 66-67.
2. Notably, the markets which would thereby be freed from international labor "regu-
lation" in order to foster competition based on "comparative advantage" would
continue to be regulated so as to promote the development of industries by creat-
ing secure financial markets, supporting the creation and consolidation of multi-
national corporate structures, and, of course, promoting so-called free trade.
3. Noam Chomsky, Free Trade and Free Market: Pretense and Practice, in THE
CULTURES OF GLOBALIZATION (Fredric Jameson and Masao Miyoshi, eds. 1998) at
359-361.
4. Id.
5. The belief that protectionism impedes growth is treated by economic historian
Paul Bairoch as one of the greatest myths concerning economic development. See
Noam Chomsky, supra note 3, at 360, citing Paul Bairoch, ECONOMICS AND WORLD
HISTORY (1993).
6. The World Trade Organization is included with the IMF and World Bank because
its treaty terms eliminate the possibility of governmental intervention to direct and
support the growth of national industries, as well as prevent state intervention to
direct the national economy in numerous other ways.
7. Jim Stanford, Openness and equity: regulating labor market outcomes in a glo-
balized economy, in GLOBALIZATION AND PROGRESSIVE ECONOMIC POLICY (Dean
Baker, Gerald Epstein and Robert Pollin, eds., 1998) at 245, 251-2.
8. Mehiene Larudee, Integration and income distribution under the North American
Free Trade Agreement: the Experience of Mexico, -in GLOBALIZATION AND PRO-
GRESSIVE ECONOMIC POLICY (Dean Baker, Gerald Epstein and Robert Pollin, eds.,
1998) at 273.
9. See e.g. NAFTA's Chapter 11; Section B, Articles 1116 & 1117 of the proposed
Multi-lateral Agreement on Investment, and the proposed Free Trade of the Ameri-
cas Agreement (FTAA), whose proposed provisions, although secret, are believed
to include and expand upon NAFTA's Chapter I I (see Maude Barlow, The Free
Trade Area of the Americas: The Threat to Social Programs, Environmental
Sustainability and Social Justice, A Special Report by the International Forum on
Globalization, I INTNATL. FORUM ON GLOBALIZATION, 2001).
10. The Seattle, Washington, and Quebec City demonstrations against the terms by
which world trade are being negotiated, and the exclusion of labor and environ-
mental concerns from those terms, indicate and have helped to foster an increased
level of public interest in these issues.
11. Although political and economic are convenient categories, placing them in bi-
nary opposition or even categorical separation is not t:.-problematic, given the
integral relationship between the two.
12. Potter's paper waivers between defining "core" rights as ones on which there is
international consensus, and ones that are "basic," "human" rights. Perhaps these
two categories overlap for the most part. But I believe that when pressed, there is
as much disagreement on the practical nature ( when implementation is attempted)
of those rights we deem "fundamental" as there is on how to define a "living
wage" or "decent working conditions." There may be more consensus on the ar-
ticulation of human or political rights, but there is just as much, if not more, dis-
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agreement as to their practical meaning as there is on articulating economic rights.
(See e.g. infra note 21).
13. Moreover, it is far from clear what a consensus concerning "core" standards means.
For instance, Convention 87 concerning the right of association and protection of
the right to organize has been ratified by 134 of the 170 ILO members. But it is
probably a better-although hardly fully-protected right in the United States,
which has not ratified it, than in many of the 134 countries that have, e.g. Myanmar.
Moreover, even as to those core conventions which have been ratified, there is
disagreement about their scope. ILO Convention 29 prohibits forced labor, but
exempts labor performed pursuant to a criminal conviction, provided it is per-
formed under the control of a public authority and those performing it are not
placed at the disposal of private individuals or companies. The U.S. Federal Prison
Industries (FPI), also known as Unicor, employs 18,000 inmates making 150 prod-
ucts, with sales of $500 million in 1995. While the bulk of sales are to the Federal
government, and are thus beyond Convention 29's reach, there is evidence that a
growing number of large corporations have begun to "lease" the labor of inmates
working in private prisons. The U.S. has not ratified Convention 29, but it did, in
1991, ratify Convention 105, The Abolition of Forced Labor Convention of 1957.
Article 1(b) of that convention prohibits the mobilization and use of forced labor
for economic development, and it is likewise arguably violated by the private leas-
ing of prison labor. Indeed, it may be violated by the degree of public use of prison
labor in the U.S., since that use frees up $500 million in tax dollars which can then
be spent on economic development (such as public funding of private develop-
ment of weapons systems, biological research, energy production, and the like.)
And there is a great deal of disagreement about the precise contours of the "core"
freedom to associate, a right of little use in improving labor standards if it does not
include the disputed rights to organize and strike. Although Convention 87 has
been ratified by 134 countries (not including the United States), there is disagree-
ment about whether Article 3 of that Convention, concerning the right of organi-
zations to undertake actions to defend their own and their members' interests in-
cludes the right to strike, and employer members of the ILO have challenged such
an interpretation. See LAMy BErrEN, supra note 1.
14. These suggestions draw heavily on the work of Kaushik Basu, Professor of Inter-
national Studies at Cornell University and a former World Bank official. I am
greatly indebted to Professor Basu, but the views here, and any errors or naivete
they may embody, are entirely my own. See e.g. Kaushik Basu, International La-
bor Standards and Child Labor, 42 CHALLENGE 80-92 (Sept/Oct 1999); Kaushik
Basu, Child Labor: Cause, Consequence and Cure, with Remarks on Interna-
tional Labor Standards, 37 JOURN. ECON. Lrr. 1083 (1999).
15. Dividing the world between developing and industrialized is not, perhaps, ad-
equate or helpful, certainly in terms of the paradigm here described. There are
vast differences between the so-called developing nations in their degree of devel-
opment and industrialization, as well as in other respects. Because my paradigm
requires grouping them according to level of development (which is not adequately
described by reference to GNP or GDP), new terminology and methods of mea-
surement will be required. Ultimately, of course, such determinations will be
political ones (aided by semi-objective measurements), with groups of nations
determining themselves to be at roughly similar levels of development for stan-
dard-setting purposes.
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16. For want of a better label, I will call this system "development-based standard
setting."
17. Oregon, for example, had one wage for Portland, and a lower wage for rural Or-
egon; New York had different minimum wages according to the nature of the in-
dustry as well as other factors.
18. I am indebted to my colleague, Seth Harris, for bringing the Black-Connery bill,
as well as some of the other examples described here, to my attention.
19. See, discussion of the living wage movement in the U.S. in this issue at p. 44.
20. The Human Development Enterprise Index, an experiment within the ILO to mea-
sure levels of enterprise development, might also serve as a partial model. See
Guy Standing, Human Development (commenting on Archon Fund, Dara O'Rourke,
and Charles Sabel, Realizing Labor Standards) in BOSTON REVIEW, v. 26, No. 1,
Feb/Mar. 2001, at 17-18.
21. I agree with Potter's paper that unilateral trade sanctions taken by industrialized
nations to enforce labor standards for developing nations has a high potential to
backfire, as did the Harkin bill mentioned in the paper. But pacts between and
among, or labor standards established for, nations at a similar level of develop-
ment, are far more likely to achieve their intended effects, than to produce unin-
tended consequences.
22. If those parties are expanded to include NGOs and others, they, too, should be able
to commence proceedings, which would be carefully screened just as they are
now.
23. See Basu, supra note 14. Improved schooling would likely have the added benefit
of improving national comparative advantage, thereby increasing trade.
24. As Potter points out, the ILO systems of accountability are quite sophisticated,
and hence could, with more teeth, be quite effective.
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